Fraud Not on the Market: Rebutting the Presumption of Classwide Reliance Twenty Years after Basic Inc. v. Levinson by Mustokoff, Matthew L.
Hastings Business Law Journal
Volume 4
Number 2 Spring 2008 Article 9
Spring 1-1-2008
Fraud Not on the Market: Rebutting the
Presumption of Classwide Reliance Twenty Years
after Basic Inc. v. Levinson
Matthew L. Mustokoff
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_business_law_journal
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew L. Mustokoff, Fraud Not on the Market: Rebutting the Presumption of Classwide Reliance Twenty Years after Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
4 Hastings Bus. L.J. 225 (2008).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol4/iss2/9




BASIC INC. v. LEVINSON
Matthew L. Mustokoff
I. INTRODUCTION
To establish securities fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 1 Ob-5 thereunder, a plaintiff must allege
reliance upon a material misstatement or omission of fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security. Plaintiffs that are unable to allege
that they actually relied upon the statements at issue regularly invoke the
rebuttable presumption of reliance based on the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory. This doctrine presumes that all publicly available information
concerning a security has been incorporated into that security's price,
thereby enabling investors to rely on the integrity of the market price when
making an investment decision. The fraud-on-the-market presumption,
which derives from an economics theory dubbed the "efficient market
hypothesis," was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson' almost two decades ago. Ever since, the district and circuit
" Matthew L. Mustokoff concentrates his practice in securities and commodities litigation,
corporate governance and fiduciary law, internal investigations, and white collar criminal matters at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in New York. His numerous articles have appeared in THE FEDERAL
LAWYER, SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL, INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
ADVISOR, and MAINE LAW REVIEW, among other publications. He is a graduate of Wesleyan
University (B.A.) and the Temple University School of Law (J.D.).
1. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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courts have grappled with the applicability of the presumption at various
stages of securities fraud litigation, including class certification,
particularly in cases involving securities that are not heavily traded or listed
on prominent exchanges.
In a wave of recent decisions, the courts have made it tougher for
plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particular security trades in an efficient
market for purposes of triggering the classwide presumption of reliance.
There are two principal reasons for this trend.
First, the courts have interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
which governs the requirements for class certification, more stringently in
recent years. Among Rule 23's prerequisites is the so-called
"predominance" requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) which requires class
plaintiffs to demonstrate that "questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members."' In the majority of cases discussed in this article, the
courts engaged in extensive fact-finding on the question of market
efficiency in determining whether the Basic presumption applied for
purposes of satisfying the rigorous requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Second, the expert evidence that has been permitted at the class
certification stage in these proceedings has become exponentially more
sophisticated and complex. Expert analyses of market movements, trading
patterns among arbitrageurs, and the assimilation of market information by
analysts and the investing public have provided an enormous benefit to
issuers and other defendants in fraud-on-the-market cases by supplying the
courts with the empirical proof of an inefficient market required to rebut
the Basic presumption.
This article explores several recent decisions in which class
certification was denied on the basis of the plaintiffs' failure to establish an
efficient market for the security underlying the fraud claim. These
decisions serve as reminders to shareholder plaintiffs eager to invoke the
fraud-on-the-market presumption as a means of establishing reliance
through common, generalized proof that application of the presumption is
not automatic and may be rebutted by an evidentiary showing of market
inefficiency. They also highlight the critical role of expert reports and
testimony in Rule 23 proceedings, particularly when the security at issue is
not a familiar or heavily traded security and presents a borderline case for
the applicability of Basic.
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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II. THE BASIC PRESUMPTION
As explained by the Supreme Court in Basic, the "efficient market
hypothesis" - from which the fraud-on-the-market theory stems - posits
that, "'in an open and developed securities market, the price of a
company's stock is determined by the available material information
regarding the company and its business. ... "' The Court concluded that
investors that buy or sell stock at the price set by the market do so "in
reliance on the integrity of that price," and because all publicly available
information has been reflected in that price, "an investor's reliance on any
public material misrepresentations ... may be presumed for purposes of a
Rule I Ob-5 action."4
Application of the fraud-on-the-market presumption, however, is not
mechanical and may be rebutted by "[a]ny showing that severs the link
between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or
paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price. 5 As
one federal appeals court interpreting Basic has explained,
[T]he presumption of reliance may be rebutted by showing that the
market did not respond to the alleged misrepresentations, or that the
plaintiff did not actually rely on the market price when making his or
her investment decision .... a defendant may [also] defeat the
presumption of reliance by showing that the plaintiffs reliance on the
6
market price was actually unreasonable.
One of the most common methods of rebutting the presumption is by
demonstrating that the relevant security did not trade in an efficient market
during the contested period - i.e., that the alleged misrepresentations
which caused the stock's price to fall were not assimilated into the price of
the security. By way of example, the courts have refused to recognize the
presumption in cases involving securities traded over-the-counter or on
"pink sheets,"7 newly issued municipal bonds,8 and mutual funds.9 In each
3. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).
4. Id at 247.
5. Id. at 248.
6. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 179 (3d Cir. 2000).
7. See Binder v. Gillepsie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (decertifying class; market for
stock traded on "pink sheets" that circulate daily and contain "bid" and "ask" process, but do not
include trading information such as sales volume on actual prices paid, is not efficient); Krogman v.
Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (presumption did not apply because over-the-counter
bulletin board market was not an efficient market).
8. See Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) ("We hold in the
instant case that a primary market for newly issued municipal bonds as a matter of law is not
efficient.").
9 See Clark v. Nevis Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 04 Civ. 2702, 2005 U S. Dist. LEXIS 3158, at
*56-57 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2005) ("A plaintiff who has allegedly acquired shares in a mutual fund, the
price for which is unaffected by alleged misrepresentations and omissions concerning the fund itself,
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case, the court either dismissed the complaint or denied class certification
on the ground that the security at issue did not (or could not) trade in an
efficient market.
In Cammer v. Bloom, a decision issued one year after Basic, the
District Court of New Jersey adopted a practical, five-factor test for
determining whether an efficient market exists for purposes of presuming
reliance under Basic.'° These factors include:
* the security's average weekly trading volume expressed as a
percentage of total outstanding shares;
* the number of securities analysts reporting on the security;
* the extent to which market makers and arbitrageurs trade in the
security;
* the issuer's eligibility to file SEC registration Form S-3 (as
opposed to Form S-I or S-2); and
o the existence of empirical facts demonstrating a cause and effect
relationship between unpredicted corporate events or releases of
financial data and an immediate reaction in the security's price."
The courts have come to rely on Cammer as a guidepost for fraud-on-
the-market analysis. And inevitably, the analysis tends to focus on what
several judges have identified as the "most important"'' 2 Cammer factor: the
cause and effect relationship between market news and market price.
III. BOMBARDIER: A CASE STUDY FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE CAMMER
FACTORS
In a 2006 decision by District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the
Southern District of New York, the court found that the fraud-on-the-
market presumption did not apply in a case involving certificates of
mortgage-backed securities. In Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division
Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc.,'3 the court found that the plaintiff
pension fund was unable to establish that the certificates underlying the
may not establish reliance by invoking the integrity of the market or the so-called fraud-on-the-market
theory"; the "fraud-on-the-market [theory] does not apply [in the mutual fund context] because the
share price of a mutual fund is not affected by alleged misrepresentations and omissions. The share
price of a mutual fund is determined by the value of all the underlying securities it holds at a given time,
and the fund price fluctuates with the price of those underlying securities."); In re Van Wagoner Funds,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02-03383, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24866, at *22 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2004)
("[B]ecause a mutual fund share price is not determined by the market, but the underlying asset value,
the Court finds that the [plaintiffs] have not sufficiently pled fraud-on-the-market reliance.").
10. 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989).
11. Id. at 1287.
12. E.g, In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 512 (1st Cir. 2005).
13. No. 05 Civ. 1898, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52991 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1,2006).
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fraud claims traded in an efficient market and, therefore, the putative class
did not satisfy the requisites for class certification under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.' While the Bombardier decision does not forge any
new law or depart from established principles, the court's exploration of
the contours of the fraud-on-the-market-theory and methodical balancing of
the various, judicially crafted factors used to ascertain market efficiency
provides an instructive precedent to guide courts in future cases.
Lead plaintiff Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund
("Teamsters") brought section 10(b) claims on behalf of open market
purchasers of certain certificates ("the Certificates") offered by defendants
Bombardier Capital Mortgage Securitization Corporation and Bombardier
Capital, Inc. ("Bombardier"). Teamsters alleged that Bombardier
misrepresented the integrity of mobile home installment sales contracts and
mortgage loans serving as the collateral for the Certificates. Teamsters
sought an order to certify the action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23.
In arguing that the putative class satisfies the "predominance" requirement
of Rule 23(b)(3), Teamsters maintained that the market for the Certificates
was efficient and, thus, the putative class could rely on the fraud-on-the-
market presumption.
At the outset, Judge Scheindlin noted that while the Second Circuit
has not adopted a test for determining whether the market for a security is
efficient, courts have historically looked to the five factors enunciated by
the court in Cammer, as well as three additional factors - the issuer's
market capitalization, the bid-ask spread for stock sales, and the "float," or
the security's trading volume excluding insider-owned stock - that are
applicable when the security at issue is an equity. 15 Judge Scheindlin
explained that "[c]ourts should use these factors as an analytical tool rather
than as a checklist.'
' 6
In noting that the Cammer factors are not exhaustive, the court
emphasized that the analysis under Basic must also take into account the
definition of "market efficiency." The court highlighted the First Circuit
Court of Appeals' 2005 decision in In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.,7 in
which the First Circuit adopted what it characterized as the "prevailing
definition of market efficiency."' 8
Under this definition, an "efficient market" is "'one in which market
price fully reflects all publicly available information."" 9  As the First
14. Id. at *57-59.
15. Id. at *21-22 (citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286-87).
16. Id. at *22 (citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286-87; Krogman, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474-78 (N.D.
Tex. 2001)).
17. 432 F.3d I (Ist Cir. 2005).
18. Id at 10.
19. Id (emphasis added). In PolyMedica Corp, the First Circuit rejected the district court's
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Circuit explained, in an efficient market, the "'ordinary investor"' can
never "'beat the stock market'" or "'make trading profits on the basis of
new information"' because "the market price already reflects the new
information."2  The PolyMedica Court's definition of market efficiency
adopts what is known in the literature as the "semi-strong" form of the
efficient market hypothesis. As explained by the First Circuit:
There are three competing forms of [the efficient market] hypothesis -
weak, semi-strong, and strong - each of which makes a progressively
stronger claim about the kind of information that is reflected in stock
price. Under the weak form, an efficient market is one in which
historical price data is reflected in the current price of the stock, such
that an ordinary investor cannot profit by trading stock based on the
historical movements in stock price. Under the semi-strong form, an
efficient market is one in which all publicly available information is
reflected in the market price of the stock, such that an investor's efforts
to acquire and analyze public information (about the company, the
industry, or the economy, for instance) will not produce superior
investment results. Finally, under the strong form, an efficient market
is one in which stock price reflects not just historical price data or all
publicly available information, but all possible information - both
public and private. Based on this form of an efficient market, not even
an inside trader can outperform other investors because all such
information is reflected in the market price. 1
The PolyMedica Court essentially concluded that the "semi-strong"
form of the efficient market hypothesis is the "one most consistent with the
understanding of market efficiency espoused by the Supreme Court in
Basic when it adopted and defined the contours of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption.'
22
Having adopted the PolyMedica definition of market efficiency, the
Bombardier Court turned to its analysis of the parties' experts' arguments
concerning whether the Certificates traded in an efficient market,
systematically applying each of the Cammer factors to determine whether
Teamsters demonstrated the efficiency of the market by a "preponderance
of the evidence" - the applicable standard of proof in Rule 23 certification
proceedings.
With respect to the first factor, trading volume, the court found that
holding that "'the 'efficient' market required for [the] 'fraud on the market' presumption of reliance
is... one in which market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material
statements about companies,"' as opposed to a market in which "'a stock price rapidly reflects all
publicly available material information."' Id. (quoting In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec Litig., 224 F.R.D.
27,41 (D. Mass 2004)) (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id. at 10 n.16 (emphasis added).
22 Id. at ll-15.
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the Certificates' weekly "turnover," or average weekly trading volume as a
percentage of outstanding shares, of 8.5 percent supports a finding that the
Certificates traded in a efficient market. In so finding, the court relied on
Cammer, which held that a turnover of two percent or more of outstanding
shares "would justify a strong presumption that the market for the security
is an efficient one. 23
The court found that the second factor, the extent of analyst coverage
of the security, militates in Bombardier's favor. The court rejected
Teamsters' argument that because forty-four financial analysts actively
covered Bombardier, Inc. ("BI") - the parent company of the Bombardier
entity responsible for servicing the collateral on the Certificates - these
same analysts can be said to have followed the Certificates as well. As the
court explained, "Teamsters has presented no evidence that analysts
specifically followed the Certificates, the value of which is tied to the
performance of the underlying mobile homes, and only incidentally to the
performance of BI or its subsidiaries.,
24
The third factor, the existence of market makers, was also found to tilt
in Bombardier's favor. In applying this factor, the court relied on the
SEC's regulations which define "market maker" as one who,
with respect to a particular security, (i) regularly publishes bona fide,
competitive bid and offer quotations in a recognized interdealer
quotation system; or (ii) furnishes bona fide competitive bid and offer
quotations on request; and, (iii) is ready, willing and able to effect
transactions in reasonable quantities at his quoted prices with other
brokers or dealers.
25
As the court explained, because Teamsters could not establish that any firm
regularly published bids and quotes for the Certificates or would furnish
bids and quotes on request and effect transactions for the Certificates, this
factor supports a finding that the Certificates traded in an inefficient
market.
There was no dispute as to the fourth factor, the filing of an SEC
Registration Form S-3. For each class of Certificates, Bombardier filed a
Form S-3, a fact supporting a finding that the Certificates traded in an
efficient market.
The court found that the fifth factor, causation, supported a showing of
an inefficient market. The court rejected Teamsters' expert's event study
of Certificate price movement which purported to show that numerous
positive and negative announcements corresponded with anomalous
23. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1293 (D N.J. 1989).
24. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 1898, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52991, at *50 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006) (emphasis added).
25. Id at *51-52 (citing 17 C.F.R. §240.15c3-1[c]8 (2006)).
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movements in the Certificates' prices. As the court explained, Teamsters'
event study was deficient insofar as it relied on Bloomberg prices - as
opposed to transaction prices - which take into account transaction prices
as well as current news concerning the issuer. To that end, the court
credited Bombardier's expert, who maintained that the Bloomberg prices
for the Certificates are not as reliable as the transaction prices in that they
(i) experienced greater variation over time than the transaction prices, and
(ii) reacted much more significantly to unanticipated news than the
transaction prices.
The court was not persuaded by Teamsters' response that the price
indications provided by proprietary pricing services such as Bloomberg
constitute a "reasonable proxy" for transaction prices when there are no
publicly available prices. As Judge Scheindlin reasoned, because
Bloomberg and other proprietary services "presuppose" that security prices
reflect information about the issuer (or, in the instant case, the Certificate
collateral) these so-called "prices" "assume market efficiency." The court
found that "[t]o use prices that assume market efficiency in an event study
designed to determine whether or not that market is efficient is circular
reasoning" and stated that because of the material discrepancy between the
Bloomberg prices and the transaction prices, the transaction prices are the
more meaningful indicator of market efficiency.26 As there were no
material price drops in the Certificates after they were unexpectedly
downgraded below investment grade, the Court concluded that the
causation factor cuts in favor of a finding that the Certificates did not trade
in an efficient market.
In weighing the totality of the circumstances - and in particular, the
lack of a causal relationship between unforeseen news and a direct,
immediate reaction in the price of the Certificates - the Bombardier court
found that the market for the Certificates was inefficient and refused to
certify the class.2 7
26. Id. at *55.
27. The court also found that Teamsters could not rely upon the presumption of reliance based on
the doctrine of Affiliated Ute Citizens v United States, 406 U S. 128, 153-54 (1972), in which the
Supreme Court held that in securities fraud cases "involving pnmarily [allegations of] a failure to
disclose, proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery," but rather reliance may be presumed.
Judge Scheindlin quickly disposed of Teamsters' argument that the Affihated Ute presumption applies.
As the court explained, Teamsters' Section 10(b) claims are premised, not on an alleged failure to
disclose, but rather on "affirmative misstatements" allegedly made by Bombardier regarding its
purported adherence to underwriting standards and the causes of the Certificates' poor performance;
thus Affiliated Ute does not avail Teamsters with a presumption of reliance. Teamsters, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52991, at *45-46
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IV. POLYMEDICA: THE IMPACT OF "FUNDAMENTAL VALUE EFFICIENCY"
Less than two months after the Bombardier decision came down,
District Judge William G. Young of the District of Massachusetts resolved
the class certification dispute in In re Polymedica Securities Litigation8
that was the subject of the appeal discussed above in which the First Circuit
adopted the "semi-strong" definition of an efficient market, i.e., one in
which the market price of the stock fully reflects all publicly available
information.
By way of background, in 2005 the First Circuit vacated District
Judge Robert Keeton's order granting the original certification motion in
which the district court had held that "the 'efficient' market required for
[the] 'fraud on the market' presumption of reliance is. . . 'one in which
market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material
statements about companies.' ' 29  In addition to adopting semi-strong
definition of market efficiency, the First Circuit held that a district court
may properly go beyond the pleadings when deciding a Rule 23 class
certification motion, explaining that there must be a "rigorous analysis of
the prerequisites established by Rule 23 before certifying a class. 3 °
On remand, Judge Young was faced with the question of whether
PolyMedica shares traded on an efficient market during the class period in
light of the First Circuit's newly adopted definition of market efficiency.
The court first focused on the Cammer factors, finding that the first four
factors - average trading volume, number of analysts, presence of market
makers and eligibility to file a Form S-3 registration - favored the
plaintiffs and militated toward a finding of market efficiency for
PolyMedica stock. "As for the 'most important" Cammer factor,' however,
the court found that the plaintiffs' expert's analysis left "much to be
desired."'" PolyMedica's expert sharply criticized plaintiffs' assertion that
because PolyMedica's stock price reacted in the marketplace on significant
news days, the stock's market was demonstrably efficient for fraud-on-the-
market purposes. The plaintiffs' expert's analysis relied solely on a listing
of five price movements during the contested time period, each of which
corresponded to a major news event. On cross-examination, PolyMedica's
expert testified as follows:
[Y]ou went and searched for the largest price drops. That's not a
scientific study. A scientific study is one where you draw a sample and
28. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass 2006).
29. In re PolyMedica Corp. See. Litig., 224 F.R.D. 27, 41 (D. Mass. 2004) (emphasis added).
30. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig, 432 F.3d I, 6 (1st Cir 2005) (citing Smilow v.
Southwestem Bell Mobile Systems, 323 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2003)).
31 In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d at 268-69.
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then you compare a test statistic from that sample to another
sample .... All you did was went and picked the largest stock price
drops and said, oh, gee, that just shows that it's informationally
efficient. You picked five days out of about 160 trading days. What
you should do is look at all 160 trading days and do a scientific study to
see if there's a difference between the news days and the non-news
days. And if you would have done that you would have found that
there wasn't any difference between them.
32
Essentially, PolyMedica, through its expert, established that the
fluctuations in the company's stock during the contested period occurred as
much on days when significant market news was announced as on days
when there were no big news announcements. As the court explained, the
plaintiffs' expert's "mere listing of five days on which news was released
and which exhibited large price fluctuations proves nothing., 33 The court
also concluded that the plaintiffs' expert analysis failed to demonstrate "not
only that news caused price movements, but also that those movements
were 'fully' and 'quickly' reflected in PolyMedica's stock price. Nothing
in Miller's [experti analysis tends to show that all reactions to any news
event were regularly complete within any given time frame, let alone
'quickly."' 34 As a result, the court expressed its doubts that plaintiffs could
meet the standard set forth by the First Circuit, and in referring to an oft-
quoted baseball legend, noted that, "[it may be true, as Miller suggests,
that one 'can observe a lot just by watchin,' but Yogi Berra is hardly a
competent expert in market efficiency.,
35
As if the plaintiffs' failure to establish market efficiency under the
Cammer test was not enough, the court, in denying the plaintiffs' bid for
class certification, underscored PolyMedica's expert's demonstration of
"fundamental value efficiency," or the ability of a particular security to be
accurately valued by the market. The court explained that fundamental
value efficiency is separate, but related, to the concept of "information
efficiency" which underlies the First Circuit's definition of market
efficiency. As the court elucidated,
Information efficiency must be distinguished from fundamental
value efficiency. An information efficient market need not accurately
respond to information such that "market prices mirror the best possible
estimates, in light of all available information, of the actual economic
values of securities in terms of their expected risks and returns. A
market that is fundamental value efficient is both information efficient
and accurate in its valuation of stocks. Thus, it is possible for a market
32. Id at 269. The court found PolyMedica's expert to be "particularly credible and informative.
His responsiveness to the Court's questions was both helpful and impressive." Id at 269 n.7.
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to be information efficient but not fundamental value efficient.
The First Circuit requires only that a market be information
efficient, not fundamental value efficient. Still, 'as a matter of logic,'
evidence related to fundamental value efficiency may be relevant
because fundamental value efficiency incorporates information about
information efficiency.36
The PolyMedica court thus went beyond the First Circuit's analysis,
taking into consideration not only whether the price of PolyMedica stock
did quickly and fully respond to news, but also whether the structure of the
market for PolyMedica stock was such that it could do so. 37 In recognizing
that its analysis must be guided by the First Circuit's emphasis on the
information efficiency test, the court explained that it "will tie itself to the
mast of information efficiency, but loosen the bindings when
considerations of fundamental value efficiency proves beneficial to the
analysis.,
38
The court then turned to the defendant's expert's observation that
short selling 39 of PolyMedica stock was notably difficult, a factor tending
to demonstrate a lack of fundamental value efficiency. PolyMedica's
expert proffered evidence that compared to the average 1.9 trading days
required to cover a short sale of securities listed on the NASDAQ
exchange, for PolyMedica stock it took an average of ten days during the
same period and at one point took as many as twenty days.40 It was further
demonstrated that as a result of this inability to find short sellers for
PolyMedica stock that, the transaction costs for short selling the company's
stock became prohibitively high.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that PolyMedica's short
sales analysis addresses the fundamental value efficiency of the company's
stock, but not the information efficiency which is required by the First
Circuit standard. Noting that the role of market arbitrage, including short
sales, is significant in determining the efficiency of a security's market, the
court found that the constraints on short selling for PolyMedica stock
demonstrated a lack of fundamental value efficiency which, as the First
36. Id at 271-72 (quoting Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: An Introduction
to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 640 (2003)).
37. Id at 273.
38. Id.
39. The Second Circuit recently described short selling as follows:
An investor sells short when he sells a security that he does not own by
borrowing the security, typically from a broker. At a later date, he 'covers' his
short position by purchasing the security and returning it to the lender. A short
seller speculates that the price of the security will drop. If the price drops, the
investor profits by covering for less than the short sale price.
ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 96 n.I (2d Cir. 2007).
40. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74.
Spring 2008]
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Circuit observed, "'may be relevant to the rinformation] efficiency
determination as, for example, circumstantial evidence that arbitrageurs are
not trading in the market, with the result that securities prices do not fully
reflect all publicly available information. ' 'A
Finally, the PolyMedica court relied on evidence put forth by the
defendant's expert that the price of PolyMedica's stock, perhaps as a result
of the limitations on short selling, exhibited what is known as "positive
serial correlation" - a continual delay in the processing of market
information into the stock price - for a five- month period.42 As the court
explained, this phenomenon is not present in efficiently traded securities
which can assimilate market news within a short, if not instantaneous, time
frame. The court held that the First Circuit's definition of market
efficiency, which stated that stock price must "quickly and fully reflect the
release of public information such that ordinary investors cannot profitably
trade on the basis of it, requires that the reaction to news be fully completed
on the same trading day as its release - and perhaps even within hours or
minutes. '  The court concluded that the positive serial correlation of
PolyMedica stock precluded a finding of market efficiency: "Such a
condition is fundamentally incompatible with the standard the First Circuit
announced."4
V. INREIPO: THE SECOND CIRCUIT RATCHETS UP RULE 23
In Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Public Offering Sec.
Litig.) ("In re IPO"),45 the Second Circuit held that in deciding a class
certification motion under Rule 23, district courts must consider sufficient
evidence to reach a proper "determination" of whether the purported class
has satisfied the requirements for certification, even though such
determination may intersect with, or indeed encompass, the actual merits of
the case.46 In clarifying the framework for Rule 23 inquiry in the Second
Circuit - and in particular, in emphasizing a district court's obligation to
undertake a thorough examination of the competing evidence on market
efficiency at the class certification stage - the In re IPO decision is in
many respects a loud avowal of the district courts' methods and processes
in Bombardier and PolyMedica. As the Second Circuit held, "the district
judge must receive enough evidence, by affidavits, documents, or
41. Id. at 276 (quoting In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2005)).
42. See id. at 276-278.
43. Id. at 278.
44. Id.
45. 471 F3d24(2dCir. 2006)
46. Id. at4.
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testimony, to be satisfied that each Rule 23 requirement has been met."47
In certifying the shareholder class below, District Judge Scheindlin
declined to weigh the parties' dueling expert reports addressing, among
other things, whether the initial public offering shares underlying the
plaintiffs' fraud claims traded in an efficient market. The district court
applied a "some showing" standard in finding that the purported class had
satisfied the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) by invoking the
Basic presumption.
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected Judge Scheindlin's "some
showing" standard as too lenient.48 In defining the contours of a district
court's scope of review on a Rule 23 class certification motion, the Second
Circuit explained that a district court, in determining whether all Rule 23
requirements have been met, should not be constrained in its factual inquiry
even if there is some overlap between the issues raised by the class
certification motion and issues which go directly to the merits.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit cautioned that district courts should avoid
an examination of the merits with respect to issues that are "unrelated" to
the Rule 23 inquiry.49
Before turning to the parties' competing evidence on whether the IPO
shares at issue traded in an efficient market, the IPO court set forth the
following conclusions of law:
(1) a district judge may certify a class only after making determinations
that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met;
(2) such determinations can be made only if the judge resolves factual
disputes relevant to each Rule 23 requirement and finds that whatever
underlying facts are relevant to a particular Rule 23 requirement have
been established and is persuaded to rule, based on the relevant facts
and the applicable legal standard, that the requirement is met;
(3) the obligation to make such determinations is not lessened by
overlap between a Rule 23 requirement and a merits issue, even a
merits issue that is identical with a Rule 23 requirement;
(4) in making such determinations, a district judge should not assess
any aspect of the merits unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement; and
(5) a district judge has ample discretion to circumscribe both the extent
of discovery concerning Rule 23 requirements and the extent of a
hearing to determine whether such requirements are met in order to
assure that a class certification motion does not become a pretext for a
partial trial of the merits.
50
The Second Circuit stated that these conclusions "necessarily
47. Id. at 42.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 41.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
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preclude" the application of a "some showing" standard at the Rule 23
stage and that the district judge must assess "all of the relevant evidence
admitted at the class certification stage.. ..just as the judge would resolve a
dispute about any other threshold prerequisite for continuing a lawsuit."'"
Turning to the particular facts of the case, the IPO court explained that
while in some circumstances, it would be appropriate to remand a class
certification dispute to the district court for reconsideration, in this case
remand was not necessary because "the Plaintiffs' own allegations and
evidence demonstrate that the Rule 23 requirement of predominance of
common questions over individual questions cannot be met under the
standards as we have explicated them."5 With respect to plaintiffs' fraud-
on-the market argument, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs could not
avail themselves of the presumption of reliance because shares of initial
public offerings cannot trade on an efficient market. Citing to the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath 3 - a case holding
that newly issued, non-exchange traded municipal bonds do not trade in an
efficient market - the IPO court explained that "'a primary market for
newly issued rsecurities] is not efficient or developed under any definition
of these terms."' 54 The court noted that an efficient market for the IPO
shares cannot be demonstrated because during the 25-day "quiet period"
imposed by SEC regulations,55 analysts cannot report on securities trading
as part of an IPO, thus negating one of the hallmarks of an efficient market
- significant analyst coverage.56  The Second Circuit also found that
plaintiffs' own allegations with respect to how slow the market was to
correct the price inflation of the IPO shares allegedly caused by the
defendant-underwriters "indicate[s] the very antithesis of an efficient
market."57  Having failed to trigger the Basic presumption through a
showing of market efficiency, plaintiffs, the court held, could not satisfy
the predominance requirement for class certification.
VI. ENRON AND STONERIDGE: "SCHEME" LIABILITY FOR "NON-SPEAKING"
DEFENDANTS IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH BASIC
In March 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied
a bid for class certification by Enron shareholders as they attempted to hold
three investment banks liable for their alleged participation in Enron's
51. Id. at 42.
52. Id.
53. 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990).
54. In re IPO, 471 F. 3d at 43 (quoting Freeman, 915 F.2d at 199).
55. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.174(d) (2008), 242.101(b)(1) (2002).
56. SeeInreIPO, 471 F. 3d at 43.
57. Id.
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accounting machinations. In Regents of Univ. of California v. Credit
Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc. ("Enron"),5" the Fifth Circuit found that the
shareholder plaintiffs could not invoke the Basic presumption as they were
unable to establish that the banks owed the purported class a duty to
disclose material information about Enron's financial condition. As the
court reasoned, because the banks did not owe an affirmative duty to Enron
shareholders to disclose misstatements in Enron's financial reports, the
plaintiffs could not presume reliance in accord with Basic. This decision
reversed District Judge Melinda Harmon's certification order with respect
to the defendant banks which was premised on the lower court's view that a
showing of an efficient market was not required to invoke the Basic
presumption at the class certification stage in a case involving allegations
of "scheme" liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) for fraudulent conduct
that is distinct from written or verbal misrepresentations to the marketplace.
Central to the Fifth Circuit's reversal of the district court's
certification order was its rejection of scheme liability under Rule lOb-5(a)
and (c). Scheme liability is a doctrine which arose in the wake of Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., in which the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in a private damages action under
Section 1 0(b) cannot recover against an aider and abettor of another party's
fraud.59 In an effort to evade Central Bank's bar on aider and abettor
liability, plaintiffs have sought to ensnare underwriters, lenders, broker-
dealers and other "secondary actors" for their roles in alleged financial
frauds by relying on the "scheme" liability prongs of Rule 10b-5:
subsections (a) and (c). These subsections, which prohibit the employment
of a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," and an "act, practice or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit," address a
category of "non-verbal" or "non-representational" fraudulent conduct that
is analytically distinct from the more familiar, garden-variety
misrepresentations and omissions of material fact proscribed by subsection
(b) of the rule.6" The underpinning of the scheme liability doctrine is that
while these secondary actors may not themselves have, either by
misstatement or omission, made actionable representations, they are
nevertheless liable for primary violations of section 10(b) through their
manipulative or deceptive acts.
58. 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007).
59. 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994) (holding that Section 10(b) does not reach parties "who do not
engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do").
60. Before Central Bank, plaintiffs rarely invoked subsections (a) and (c), because, as District
Judge Kaplan has surmised, during the pre-Central Bank era of aiding and abetting liability, the "path
of least resistance" for a plaintiff alleging a fraud involving multiple actors was to plead that one
defendant misrepresented or omitted a material fact and that the other defendants aided and abetted the
making of that misrepresentation or omission. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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In rejecting scheme liability, the Enron court stated that "rt]he
appropriate starting point is the text of the statute" ' - Section 10(b) -
which prohibits a "manipulative or deceptive" act. The court relied heavily
on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. ("Charter Communications "),6' a decision which
was appealed to, and recently upheld by, the U.S. Supreme Court.6 3 The
Eighth Circuit in Stoneridge was the first circuit court following Central
Bank to address - and reject - scheme liability. In endorsing the
reasoning of Stoneridge and refusing to follow the Ninth Circuit position
that a defendant can be liable under Rule 1Ob-5(a) or (c) if he is found to
have "engaged in conduct that had the principal purpose and effect of
creating a false appearance of fact in furtherance of [a fraudulent]
scheme,"' the Enron court stated:
The Eighth Circuit, unlike the Ninth, has correctly taken [post-Central
Bank] decisions collectively to mean that "'deceptive' conduct involves
either a misstatement or a failure to disclose by one who has a duty to
disclose." That court quoted the technical definition of "manipulation"
from Santa Fe [Indus., Inc. v. Green] and stated that "any defendant
who does not make or affirmatively cause to be made a fraudulent
statement or omission, or who does not directly engage in manipulative
securities trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding and abetting and
cannot be held liable under § 10(b) or any subpart of Rule IOb-5. '65
Applying this framework, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the three
defendant investment banks could not be primary violators under Section
10(b) because they engaged in neither a "manipulative" nor "deceptive" act
within the meaning of the statute. The court explained that "manipulation"
is a term of art that has the narrow contextual meaning ascribed by the
Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, namely, unlawful trading
practices such as "'wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are
61. Enron, 482 F.3d at 387.
62. 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006).
[A]ny defendant who does not make or affirmatively cause to be made a
fraudulent misstatement or omission, or who does not directly engage in
manipulative securities trading practices, is at most guilty of aiding and abetting
and cannot be held liable under Section 10(b) or any subpart of Rule I Ob-5 ....
To impose liability for securities fraud on one party to an arm's length business
transaction in goods or services other than securities because that party knew or
should have known that the other party would use the transaction to mislead
investors in its stock would introduce potentially far-reaching duties and
uncertainties for those engaged in day-to-day business dealings. Decisions of
this magnitude should be made by Congress.
Id. at 992-93.
63. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
64. See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled by
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
65. Enron, 482 F.3d at 388 (quoting Stoneridge, 443 F.3d at 992).
[Vol. 4:2
FRAUD NOT ON THE MARKET
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity"'66 -
none of which were alleged by the Enron plaintiffs. With respect to
establishing a "deceptive" act under section 10(b), the court explained that
in the case of a defendant not alleged to have made an affirmative
misstatement, a section 10(b) plaintiff must demonstrate alternatively that
the defendant had a duty to disclose material facts and breached that duty.
As the court held, because the defendant banks owed no fiduciary or
contractual duty of disclosure to shareholders of Enron, the purported class
could not demonstrate the existence of a deceptive act on the part of the
banks:
The district court's conception of "deceptive act" liability is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision that § 10 does not give
rise to aiding and abetting liability. An act cannot be deceptive within
the meaning of § 10 where the actor has no duty to disclose. Presuming
plaintiffs' allegations to be true, Enron committed fraud by misstating
its accounts, but the banks only aided an abetted that fraud by engaging
in transactions to make it more plausible; they owed no duty to Enron's
shareholders.67
Having found that the investment banks owed no classwide duty of
disclosure to the purported class, the Fifth Circuit held, by extension, that
the plaintiffs could not invoke the Basic presumption of reliance with
respect to these defendants. The court concluded essentially that the notion
of Rule lOb-5 liability for "non-speakers" on whom the market does not
presumptively rely for information is fundamentally incompatible with the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine which is premised on market efficiency. As
the court stated:
Without its broad conception of liability for "deceptive acts," the
district court could not have found that the entire class was entitled to
rely on Basic's fraud-on-the-market theory, because the market may
not be presumed to rely on an omission or misrepresentation in a
disclosure to which it was not legally entitled. The plaintiffs are likely
correct that the market for Enron securities was efficient and that
inherent in that conclusion is the fact that the market price reflected all
publicly available information. But the factual probability that the
market relied on the banks' behavior and/or omissions does not mean
that plaintiffs are entitled to the legal presumption of reliance. 68
In this regard, the court explained that "[miarket efficiency was not
the sole condition that the Court in Basic required plaintiffs to prove
existed to qualify for the classwide presumption," and that plaintiffs must
also establish that the defendant made "public and material
66 Enron, 482 F.3d at 387 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977)).
67. Id. at 386.
68. Id. at 382-83.
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misrepresentations., 69 Applying this tenet from Basic, the Enron court
reasoned that "if the banks' actions were non-public, immaterial, or not
misrepresentative because the market had no right to rely on them (in other
words, the banks owed no duty), the banks should be able to defeat the
presumption."7"
On January 22, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Enron
plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, dealing a major blow to those who view
scheme liability as a valid subset of primary liability under section 10(b). 1
The Court's order came just a week after affirming the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Stoneridge on which the Enron Court so heavily relied. The
Supreme Court affirmed Stoneridge by a 5-3 decision. Though
Stoneridge is not a class certification case, the decision is directly pertinent
to the evolving doctrine under Basic discussed in this article.
In Stoneridge, the plaintiffs alleged that Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola, suppliers and customers of Charter Communications, entered
into sham transactions with Charter that allowed Charter to book fictitious
revenues from the transactions. 73  The Stoneridge Court, echoing the
reasoning of Enron, placed cardinal emphasis on the reliance element,
concluding that the plaintiff-investors could not trigger the fraud-on-the-
market presumption because the transactions - as opposed to Charter's
false financial statements - were not disclosed to the public, thereby
precluding reliance.74 The Court, however, did not hold - as the Fifth
Circuit in Enron and the Eighth Circuit in Stoneridge had - that a
"deceptive" act for purposes of section 10(b) necessarily entails a specific
oral or written misstatement. Rather, the Court reasoned that, even
assuming the truth of the allegations that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
- neither of whom were the issuer of the security in question - engaged
in deceptive acts by participating in sham transactions with Charter, the
respondents' deceptive acts were not "communicated to the public," and
thus plaintiffs could not establish reliance by way of Basic.75 As the Court
stated:
In effect petitioner contends that in an efficient market investors rely
not only upon the public statements relating to a security but also upon
the transactions those statements reflect. Were this concept of reliance
to be adopted, the implied cause of action [under Section 10(b)] would
reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does
69. Id. at 383 (citing Basic, 485 U.S at 248 n. 27).
70. Id.
71. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1120
(2008).
72. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 765, 774 (2008).
73. Id. at 766-67.
74. Id. at 769.
75. Id. at 769-70.
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business; and there is no authority for this rule .... [T]he investors
cannot be said to have relied upon any of the respondents' deceptive
acts in the decision to purchase or sell securities; and as the requisite
reliance cannot be shown, respondents have no liability to petitioner
under the implied right of action.76
Although Stoneridge essentially reaffirms the rule of Central Bank,
the Stoneridge Court's underscoring of reliance to clarify the contours of
primary liability under section 10(b) is a departure from much of the post-
Central Bank jurisprudence, where the principal question weighing on the
district and circuit courts was whether non-representational conduct, such
as structuring or financing fraudulent transactions (as opposed to
misrepresenting or failing to disclose the true nature of those transactions to
the market), falls within section 1 0(b)'s definition of a "deceptive" act. In
Stoneridge, the Supreme Court relegated this question to ancillary status,
focusing predominantly on the role of reliance in a securities fraud. The
Stoneridge Court invoked the fraud-on-the-market doctrine to demarcate
the line between primary and secondary liability under section 10(b),
effectively drawing a boundary between the sphere of the "efficient"
market in which securities are bought and sold through reliance on
prospectuses, financial statements, proxy statements and other publicly
available sources of information, and a sphere of secondary actors - the
contractors and suppliers in Stoneridge, the investment banks in Enron -
whose deceptive acts, while beyond the reach of a private section 10(b)
action, are within the ambit of regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and state law." And by denying review of the Fifth
Circuit's Enron ruling a week later, the Supreme Court made clear that
there is no exception to Stoneridge's limitation on primary liability for
financial institutions such as the banks that allegedly facilitated Enron's
fraud on the market.
76. Id. at 770, 774 (emphasis added).
77. The Stoneridge Court reasoned that, while Central Bank prohibits private Section 10(b) claims
against secondary actors who may have participated in a fraudulent scheme, such actors remain subject
to enforcement actions by the SEC pursuant to Section 104 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, which expressly granted the SEC with enforcement power over aiders and abettors. Id. at 768-69.
In that regard, the Court placed great weight on the fact that Congress opted to "restor[e] aiding and
abetting liability in certain cases but not others" and noted its reluctance to expand the implied private
right of action under Section 10(b) in a way that would "undermine Congress' determination that this
class of defendants should be pursued by the SEC and not by private litigants." Id. at 771-72. The
Court further noted that state law provides remedies for private litigants injured by "secondary"
conduct, explaining that "the realm of ordinary business operations" that exists beyond the securities
markets is an area "already governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees." Id. at 770-71;
see also id. at 773 ("In addition some state securities laws permit state authorities to seek fines and
restitution from aiders and abettors."), citing Del. Code Ann., Tit. 6, §7325 (2005).
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VII. ALLEGIANCE TELECOM: LOSS CAUSATION AS A
FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET PREREQUISITE
Because the Enron court found that the absence of a classwide duty
was dispositive of the Enron plaintiffs' class certification motion, the court
declined to reach another question briefed by the parties: whether the
banks' alleged acts could have been viewed as a "unitary scheme giving
rise to common issues of loss causation among the class members."
However, just eight weeks after the Fifth Circuit handed down the Enron
decision, the court took up the loss causation issue in Oscar Private Equity
Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc. 79 another decision vacating a class
certification order.
In Allegiance Telecom, the Fifth Circuit - incited by "the lethal force
of certifying a class of purchasers of securities enabled by the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine" 8 - became the first circuit court to require plaintiffs to
establish a direct causal link between defendants' alleged
misrepresentations and plaintiffs' losses to trigger the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance and qualify for class certification. In so holding,
the court focused on how the question of loss causation is inextricably
linked - as a matter of doctrine, theory and precedent - to the
presumption of classwide reliance as established by Basic. The Fifth
Circuit also echoed the Second Circuit's IPO decision in its emphasis on
the necessity of a rigorous judicial inquiry at the class certification stage
that goes beyond the pleadings, addresses the merits (if necessitated by the
Rule 23 inquest), and which may require sufficient fact-finding for the
court to render a certification decision on an "informed basis. ' 's
The plaintiffs in Allegiance Telecom claimed that Allegiance, a
telecommunications provider, fraudulently misrepresented its line-
installation count in the company's first three quarterly announcements of
2001. The plaintiffs claimed that after the company restated the line-
installation count in its fourth quarter (4Q01) announcement on February
19, 2002 - (a restatement from 1,140,000 to 1,015,000 lines, or a
difference of 125,000 lines) - the company's stock dropped from $3.70 to
$2.65 per share. Allegiance filed for bankruptcy the following year. The
defendants argued that the 4Q01 restatement of the line-installation count
did not cause the stock price to drop. Rather, the defendants contended,
Allegiance's restatement of the line-installation count was just one of
several negative announcements made by Allegiance on February 19, 2002,
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007).
80. Id. at 262.
81. Id at 267.
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including (i) missed analysts' expectations on 2001 earnings per share, (ii)
a greater EBITDA loss than expected, and (iii) a very thin margin of error
for meeting revenue covenants for 2002. The defendants asserted that the
plaintiffs could not establish that the decline in Allegiance stock on
February 19, 2002 was the result of the line-installation restatement, as
opposed to these other pieces of bad news.
In certifying the class below, the district court had concluded that "the
class certification stage is not the proper time for defendants to rebut lead
Plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-market presumption," reasoning that while Basic
held that the presumption of classwide reliance was rebuttable, such
rebuttal had to await a summary judgment motion.82 On appeal, the
defendants maintained that the district court erroneously declined to
consider all evidence on the question of loss causation at the class
certification stage. The Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that "loss causation
must be established at the class certification stage by a preponderance of all
admissible evidence"83 and rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that such a
requirement "improperly shifts the burden, from a defendant's right of
rebuttal to a plaintiffs burden of proof."84
In holding that plaintiffs must show that the alleged misrepresentation
proximately caused plaintiffs' losses in order to trigger the fraud-on-the-
market presumption, the Fifth Circuit focused on the evolution of Rule 23.
The court noted that Rule 23(c)(1)(A), amended in 2003, no longer requires
a district court to rule on class certification "as soon as practicable,"85 but
now requires a ruling "at an early practicable time. 86  As the court
explained, under the old rule, class certification was viewed by district
courts as a "light step along the way, divorced from the merits of the claim"
- i.e., a threshold procedural analysis that needed to be undertaken
quickly after commencement of the proceeding without the benefit of
adequate discovery and one which, it was understood, would yield a
"tentative" decision that could be reconsidered on summary judgment or at
trial when the court is called upon to rule on the merits. 87 However, as the
court noted, the new Rule 23 "no longer characterizes the class certification
order as 'conditional"' and, as the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003
amendments instruct, "'[a] court that is not satisfied that the requirements
of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been
met"' - an inquiry which may require "'controlled discovery into the
'merits,' limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification
82 Id. at 263.
83. Id. at 265.
84. Id. at 263.
85. Id. at 267 (quoting Fed. R Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (2003)).
86. See id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (2003)).
87. Id. at 266.
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decision on an informed basis."'88
The Fifth Circuit stated that the "collective wisdom" of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules which sponsored the 2003 amendments to Rule
23 "must not be brushed aside" and applies with particular force to
securities fraud claims, especially where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiffs' allegations of loss causation are tenuous:
[T]he efficient market doctrine facilitates an extraordinary aggregation
of claims. We cannot ignore the in terrorem power of certification,
continuing to abide the practice of withholding until "trial" a merit
inquiry central to the certification decision, and failing to insist upon a
greater showing of loss causation to sustain certification, at least in the
instance of simultaneous disclosure of multiple pieces of negative
news. Nor is there sound reason for an early "tentative" certification,
which leaves loss causation for later more focused examination.89
The Fifth Circuit then stressed that the loss causation inquiry at the
class certification stage requires little by way of discovery, explaining that
"little discovery from defendants is demanded by the fraud-on-the-market
regimen. Its 'proof is drawn from public data and public filings, as in this
case. It is largely an empirical judgment that can be made then as well as
later in the litigation." 90 To that end, the court criticized district courts that
"tread too lightly on Rule 23 requirements that overlap with the [Rule] lOb-
5 merits, out of a mistaken belief that merits questions may never be
addressed at the class certification stage." 91
Having established the appropriateness of taking up the merits at the
class certification stage as necessitated by the Rule 23 inquiry, the Fifth
Circuit then sought to explain the doctrinal nexus between loss causation
and the requirements for invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
Beginning with the premise that the Supreme Court's decision in "Basic
'allows each of the circuits room to develop its own fraud-on-the-market
rules,"' the court stated that it would now require more than just proof of a
material misstatement and evidence that the relevant security traded in an
efficient market: "we require proof that the misstatement actually moved
the market., 92 In so holding, the Fifth Circuit noted that "this requirement
was not plucked from the air," but in fact derives from Basic, in which the
Supreme Court stated that the presumption of classwide reliance may be
rebutted by "'[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged
88. Id. at 267, n.26 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003
Amendments).
89. Id. at 267.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 268 AccordIn re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24,41 (2d Cir. 2006).
92. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 264-65 (quoting Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1117-18 (5th
Cir 1988)).
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misrepresentation and. .. the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff,"'
including "'a showing that the market price would not have been affected
by the alleged misrepresentations ....
The Fifth Circuit observed that this requirement - that the alleged
fraud caused the stock price to fall - is complicated in this case by the fact
that the corrective disclosure regarding the installation-line restatement was
one of several items of negative information that were announced on the
same date. At oral argument, the plaintiffs suggested that the loss
causation issue presented by Allegiance's multiple disclosures on February
19, 2002 did not affect the class certification analysis and should be
addressed at a later stage in the litigation "because loss causation
necessarily predominates, unlike individualized questions of reliance."
94
The court rejected this characterization of the loss causation issue, stating
that it "might agree, if loss causation were only empirical proof of
materiality, unmoored from the question of classwide reliance," but that the
question of loss causation speaks directly to the "semi-strong efficient
market hypothesis on which classwide reliance depends. 95
The Fifth Circuit explained that, contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion,
the notion that any disclosure of a material misrepresentation relating to a
security traded in an efficient market inevitably affects the security's price
is unsubstantiated. To that end, the court offered two explanations, in
addition to the immateriality of an alleged misrepresentation, for why a
disclosed misrepresentation might not move the stock price, both of which
are "relevant" to the issue of "classwide reliance" confronting the court:96
" First, while the market for a particular security might be
"efficient" according to the "usual indicia" (e.g., average weekly
trading volume, the extent to which securities analysts follow the
stock, the cause and effect relationship between public releases of
information and an immediate reaction in the stock price), the
market may be inefficient with respect to the particular type of
information being transmitted by the misstatement. For example,
telecommunications analysts may not necessarily digest line-
installation count information. As the court explained, this
observation "gives effect to information-type inefficiencies,
recognizing that 'the market price of a security will not be
uniformly efficient as to all types of information.'-
97
* Second, a misrepresentation might not affect stock price if the
market was "strong-form efficient" with respect to particular
93. Id. at 265 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988)).
94 Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1059, 1083 (1990)) (emphasis added).
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information, such as the line-installation count information in this
case. The court surmised that "due to insider trading, the restated
line count [may have been] reflected by the stock price well before
the 4Q01 corrective disclosure."
98
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that both of these explanations "resist
application of the semi-strong efficient-market hypothesis, the theory on
which the presumption of classwide reliance depends."9 9 As an extension
of this analysis, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were required to
establish loss causation before availing themselves of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption.
The court next turned to the competing expert reports and other
evidence proffered by the parties on the loss causation issue. As an initial
matter, the court, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, noted that in a case of
multiple, contemporaneous public disclosures by the corporate defendant, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that it is "more probable than not" that the
disclosure that corrected the alleged misstatement, and not the other
unrelated disclosures, proximately caused "a significant amount" of the
stock price decline."' ° The court explained that proof of a corrective
disclosure's "significant contribution" must be based on empirical
evidence, not an expert's mere speculation as to the materiality of the
various concurrent disclosures."'
Applying these guideposts, the court found the plaintiffs' evidence of
loss causation to be insufficient, noting that the evidence consisted
primarily of commentary by research analysts who identified Allegiance's
line-installation count restatement as a "red flag" with respect to the
company's management and overall financial picture. Specifically, the
court found that this evidence was negated by the defendants' submission
of analyst commentary that attributed the precipitous drop in Allegiance
stock to other factors, including concerns about a revenue covenant
violation, a hostile regulatory environment and customer turnover.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the analyst reports pointing to the line-
count restatement introduced by plaintiffs as "little more than well-
informed speculation."'0 2
The Fifth Circuit also faulted the plaintiffs' expert report, explaining
that while the report includes event studies establishing that Allegiance's
stock price reacted to the "entire bundle" of negative disclosures contained
in the company's 4Q01 announcement, such a reaction "suggests only
market efficiency, not loss causation, for there is no evidence linking the
98. Id.
99. Id.
100 Id. at 270 (quoting Greenberg v. Crossroads Systems, Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 2004)).
101 Id.
102. Id. at 27 1.
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culpable disclosure to the stock-price movement." 10 3 At bottom, the court
stated that in order to establish loss causation for purposes of invoking the
presumption of reliance, plaintiffs must offer "some empirically-based
showing that the corrective disclosure was more than just present at the
scene:"
The class certification decision bears due-process concerns for both
plaintiffs and defendants, and an empirical inquiry into loss causation
better addresses these concerns than an impenetrable finding akin to a
reasonable man assessment. And analyst speculation about materiality,
while better informed than a layman, more closely resembles the latter.
At least when multiple negative items are contemporaneously
announced, we are unwilling to infer loss causation without more. In
sum, only a medical doctor who has either conducted a post-mortem or
reviewed the work of another who did so, may credibly opine about the
cause of death. We do not insist upon event studies to establish loss
causation, helpful though they may be. We hold only that the opinions
of these analysts, without reference to any post-mortem data they have
reviewed or conducted, is insufficient here.
0 4
The Allegiance Telecom decision marks a major development in the
jurisprudence of Rule 1 Ob-5 class certification. The decision - the first of
its kind by a circuit court - holds that in order for securities fraud
plaintiffs to avail themselves of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
classwide reliance, establishing the existence of an efficient market and a
material misrepresentation is not enough; a showing of loss causation is
also required - at least in the case of multiple, contemporaneous and
ostensibly unrelated disclosures of negative information.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The recent decisions discussed in this article mark an important trend
in the law of class certification, one which signifies heightened judicial
scrutiny of Rule 23 motions - in many cases, going beyond the pleadings
and involving extensive fact-finding. These rulings reinforce the principle
that when confronted with a motion to certify a shareholder class in a
securities action, a district court is now required to address the merits of
the underlying fraud claims at the class certification stage to the extent that
an examination of the merits is necessitated by the court's Rule 23 inquiry.
Bombardier and PolyMedica stand as paradigms for the meticulous
103. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. ("When multiple negative items are announced
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evaluation of contending expert evidence on whether an efficient market is
present for purposes of invoking the Basic presumption of reliance. The
district courts' empirical approach to the dueling expert reports in these two
cases was effectively (if not explicitly) endorsed by the Second Circuit in
IPO and the Fifth Circuit in Allegiance Telecom. The IPO decision, in
refining the Second Circuit standard for the scope of review at the class
certification stage, mandates that district judges must receive enough
evidence, including expert testimony, to be satisfied that the purported
class has complied with Rule 23 which, in securities class actions, requires
plaintiffs to show that reliance can be presumed under Basic or some other
doctrine of classwide reliance (for example, the Affiliated Ute presumption
applicable in certain "failure to disclose" cases)." 5 The Allegiance
Telecom decision, standing on the shoulders of IPO, took Basic a step
further by holding that in addition to establishing reliance through a
showing of an efficient market, plaintiffs seeking to trigger the fraud-on-
the-market presumption must also establish loss causation - a separate but
inextricably related element of a securities fraud claim. And in Enron - a
decision in which the fraud-on-the-market analysis did not at all depend on
empirical evidence of market efficiency, but rather turned on a purely
doctrinal analysis - the Fifth Circuit held that the Basic presumption does
not apply mechanically to all defendants alleged to have participated in a
fraudulent scheme, and will not serve to certify a class against a secondary
actor who is not alleged to have committed a manipulative or deceptive act
(i.e., a primary violation of section 10(b)) within the meaning of Central
Bank and Stoneridge.
This constellation of recent decisions - which, as a group, impose a
more stringent evidentiary standard for invoking the fraud-on-the-market
presumption at the class certification stage - certainly, for the time being,
signals increased scrutiny by courts in determining whether class
certification is warranted. Moreover, should the circuit courts follow the
Fifth Circuit's lead in Allegiance Telecom, the applicability of the Basic
presumption for purposes of certifying a shareholder class will not depend
solely on whether the relevant security trades in an efficient market, but
also whether the alleged misrepresentations (or, more accurately, the
disclosure thereof) caused the stock price to drop. The interplay of reliance
and loss causation for purposes of establishing Rule 23 predominance
through the fraud-on-the-market presumption is sure to be taken up by
additional courts in forthcoming class certification disputes.
105. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), and discussion
supra, note 24.
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